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Abstract 
 Poverty analysis is in the midst of a multidimensional Ǯturnǯ due, in part, to the growing 
awareness of the limitations of relative income measures of poverty. In this paper, we 
argue that the conceptualisation of poverty remains a neglected aspect of this 
multidimensional turn to date, and demonstrate that the counter-intuitive results which 
flow from relative income analyses are not problems of measurement, but are entirely consistent with the conceptualisation of poverty under Peter Townsendǯs dominant 
Poverty as Relative Deprivation framework. In response to these problems we articulate 
an alternative framework, Poverty as Capability Deprivation, drawing on Amartya Senǯs 
capability approach, and argue that this provides more persuasive explanations for why 
some nations have greater poverty than others and why poverty remains a problem 
even in the richest nations. 
  
I Introduction 
 
The conceptualisation and measurement of poverty is a task of considerable sociological 
importance as well as policy relevance. Contemporary European poverty analysis 
continues to be heavily influenced by Peter Townsendǯs relative deprivation approach, 
and while relative income measures of poverty – for example, measuring poverty at 
60% of national median income – are experiencing something of a challenge in recent 
years, they continue to be the dominant approach to measuring poverty in Europe.  
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Nonetheless, poverty analysis is currently undergoing a multidimensional turn, due, in 
part, to a growing awareness of the limitations of such relative income measures. This 
turn towards multidimensionality has resulted in a growing number of 
multidimensional poverty applications in both European and non-European contexts 
(e.g. Coromaldi and Zoli, 2012; Whelan et al., 2014; Waglé, 2008), as well as debates 
about and innovations in the measurement of multidimensional poverty itself (e.g. 
Alkire and Foster, 2011; Alkire and Santos, 2010; Ravallion, 2011; Ferreira and Lugo, 
2013). However, a central argument presented in this paper is that the problems of 
income-centric analysis are only in part measurement problems – they are also, very 
substantially, problems of conceptualisation, and the conceptualisation of poverty 
remains a neglected aspect of this multidimensional turn to date. In this paper, we 
discuss a number of problems with the dominant Townsendian framework for 
conceptualising and measuring poverty, and articulate an alternative framework, based 
on capability approach, which, we argue, can overcome these difficulties.  
 
The capability approach was developed initially by the economist and philosopher 
Amartya Sen. Its central concepts are functionings and capabilities. ǮFunctioningsǯ refer to the various things a person succeeds in Ǯdoing or beingǯ, such as participating in the life of society, being healthy, and so forth, while Ǯcapabilitiesǯ refer to a personǯs real or 
substantive freedom to achieve such functionings; for example, the ability to take part in 
the life of society, etc. (Sen, 1999: 75). Of crucial importance is the emphasis on real or 
substantive – as opposed to formal – freedom, since capabilities are opportunities that 
one could exercise if so desired.  
 
The central claim of the approach is that in interpersonal analysis, such as poverty 
analysis, our focus should be on what people can do and be and not just on what they 
have, or how they feel (e.g. Sen, 1992). It thus focuses on ends – peopleǯs capabilities – 
rather than means – their resources. Since what people can do and be is inherently 
plural, the capability approach offers a framework which is unambiguously 
multidimensional, focussing on the many ways in which human lives are impoverished. 
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Sen argues that resource-centric approaches to understanding poverty are deficient 
because (i) people have differing needs, which means that they require different 
amounts of resources to achieve the same capabilities (variations which he calls Ǯconversion factorsǯ), and because (ii) income is just one of the influences on what 
people can do and be (e.g. Sen, 1999: 87; 2009). The approach insists on distinguishing 
between resources, which are considered to be only of instrumental importance, and 
capabilities, which, Sen argues, are of intrinsic importance (Sen, 1999: 87). This, it turns 
out, provides the foundation for a critique not just of income-centric measurement 
approaches, but also of the Townsendian tradition of poverty analysis more broadly. It 
also provides the starting point for an alternative approach to conceptualising and 
measuring poverty. As we have previously argued (Hick, 2012), however, the capability 
approach should not be understood as constituting a distinctive field of studies ȋǲcapability studiesǳȌ but that it provides a lens with which to understand our existing 
concerns – in this case, the problems of poverty and deprivation.  
 
For this reason, in this paper we restrict our attention to the contribution that the 
capability approach might make to the analysis of poverty in Europe, and do not discuss 
the many theoretical contributions and empirical applications in a range of other fields 
of study (for a recent discussion and critique in this Journal, see Kremakova, 2013; see 
also Hick and Burchardt, forthcoming). Furthermore, we do not revisit the ill-tempered 
debate between Sen and Townsend themselves (Sen, 1983; 1985; Townsend, 1985), 
which both would in later years concede had been less than illuminating, preferring 
instead to draw on their primary ideas and works. While the paper discusses the 
conceptualisation and measurement of poverty with reference to the nations of Europe, 
the arguments presented herein are intended to be of wider significance to the analysis 
of poverty in rich nations and, indeed, in comparing the performance of richer and 
poorer nations more broadly.  
 
The concept of poverty within the field of Sociology remains firmly based on the path-
breaking contribution of Peter Townsend (e.g. 1970; 1979). Townsend argued that 
poverty must be understood as a case of deprivation relative to wider society, refuting 
the idea that poverty could be understood without reference to the context in which it 
was found. Townsendǯs work represented the culmination of a re-discovery of poverty 
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in Britain (Coates and Silburn, 1973), overturning earlier optimism that poverty in 
Britain had, by and large, been eliminated in the post-war era.  
 
In contrast with earlier Ǯabsolutistǯ approaches, which focused on subsistence needs, 
Townsend argued that the concept of poverty must reflect both material and social 
needs, and that these could only be considered relative to the societies in which people lived because peopleǯs needs were socially determined. (e noted that Ǯ[a] society which 
becomes more prosperous also becomes more complex and imposes new needs on its 
membersǯ ȋTownsend, ͳͻ͹Ͳ: ͳͺ-9) and that, therefore, a poverty standard must evolve 
over time in line with changes in social customs and expectations. 
 
As it turns out, the way in which relativity was specified by Townsend is not just the 
central contribution of his framework, but also its central problem. Townsendǯs claim 
was that poverty should be understood as occurring when peopleǯs resources fell below 
levels necessary to enable to them to participate in widely-accepted living standards 
and customs within society. Townsend intended his threshold of resources to refer to 
(and thus contain) a particular meaning – namely, the level below which participation 
was withdrawn (Townsend, 1979: 57). Nonetheless, the primary way in which this 
broad approach has been operationalised has been through the use of statistics of low 
income, such as a poverty threshold set at 60 per cent of median income. Such a 
threshold has often been criticised for being arbitrary (e.g. Gordon et al., 2000: 93; 
Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2011: 16, inter alia), but if it lacks the specific meaning 
intended by the Townsendian framework at any point in time, we can at least expect 
that, over time, it rises as the framework predicts; that is, the threshold rises in line with 
median incomes in society. )t is Ǯrelativeǯ. 
 
Using a threshold of 60 per cent median income, Eurostat (n.d.) data suggest that, in 
2005, poverty in United Kingdom was greater than in Bulgaria (19 versus 14 per cent), 
despite that fact that, once we adjust for differences in purchasing parity, the poverty 
threshold in UK was more than four times greater than that of Bulgaria. Indeed, at 19 per cent, income poverty in the UK was as high as the average rate of the ͳʹ ǮNewǯ EU 
member states taken together. 
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The potential for relative income measures, such as the 60 per cent median income 
measure, to deliver seemingly counter-intuitive results when drawing comparisons 
between European nations has been the subject of significant recent scrutiny, especially 
in the context of EU enlargement since 2004 (see e.g. Kangas and Ritakallio, 2004; 
Fahey, 2007; Whelan and Maitre, 2009 a, b, inter alia). Fahey (2007: 35) summarises the 
problem thus: Ǯfollowing the recent eastern enlargement to the EU, the gap in living standards between 
the richest and poorest Member States has greatly widened, so much so that what is 
defined as the poverty threshold in the richest Member States would count as an above-average income in the poorest Member States, and the ǲpoorǳ in some states have higher 
living standards than the well-off in other statesǯ.   
 
Traditional relative income measures of poverty have typically been seen as the source 
of such counter-intuitive comparisons, and it has been argued that, in response, 
analysts might supplement these with other measures, such an income poverty 
measure set as a proportion of median European income (e.g. Fahey, 2007), a material 
deprivation measure, invariant across Europe, which captures respondents who are 
unable to afford a series of items such a three meals a day; new, and not second hand, 
clothes; and regular leisure activities (e.g. UNICEF, 2012), or a joint approach which 
focuses on the experience of both national relative income poverty and an EU-wide 
measure of material deprivation (e.g. Nolan and Whelan, 2011). 
 
This approach to measuring poverty using deprivation indicators – either on their own 
(Mack and Lansley, 1985) or, as the most recent UK Poverty and Social Exclusion survey 
intends, in combination with a low income indicator (e.g. PSE website; see also Nolan 
and Whelan, 1996) has become an important strand of analysis in the Townsendian 
tradition. It has also gained traction politically, with a deprivation measure comprising one of the three measures used to frame the European Unionǯs official poverty target to 
remove 20 million people from poverty and exclusion by 2020, as well as in the UK, 
where a joint low income and material deprivation measure was one of the four 
measures of child poverty enshrined in legislation in the Child Poverty Act 2010 
(Kennedy, 2014). 
 
However, while comparisons of the kind outlined above – that is, between Britain and 
Bulgaria – might grate with our intuitions about the extent of poverty in these countries, 
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they are not a by-product of a flawed measurement approach, but are, instead, entirely 
compatible with the Townsendian conceptualisation of poverty. As we argue below, 
from a Townsendian perspective, there is no reason why poverty, understood, to employ Nolan and Whelanǯs ȋͳͻͻ͸: ʹȌ re-worded definition, as Ǯexclusion from the life of the society owing to a lack of resourcesǯ would not be greater in Britain than Bulgaria – or even than in Burkina Faso!  
 
The counter-intuitive international comparisons which have been highlighted by a 
number of authors are, thus, not measurement problems. The problem lies in the 
conceptualisation of poverty within the Townsendian framework: such examples may 
be counter-intuitive, but – importantly – they are not counter-conceptual. However, the 
conceptualisation of poverty remains a neglected aspect of the multidimensional turn 
currently being experienced within poverty analysis, and is at risk of being overlooked. 
Given the growing awareness of the counter-intuitive results which flow from relative 
income poverty analyses, it seems to be an opportune time to reconsider the 
conceptualisation of poverty itself.  
 
This paper is comprised of four sections. First, we present an outline and critique of the 
Townsendian concept of poverty, demonstrating how this conceptualisation is prone to 
producing surprising and counter-intuitive results. In the second section, we outline an 
alternative, capability-inspired framework for conceptualising poverty and deprivation 
which we argue is more persuasive in terms of understanding poverty and deprivation 
in different nations and over time. Third, we discuss some implications of this 
framework in terms of the measurement of poverty, discussing this with reference to a 
number of recent European studies. The conclusion summarises the preceding 
arguments. 
 
II Poverty as Relative Deprivation 
 
In Poverty in the United Kingdom, Peter Townsend pioneered the use of deprivation 
indicators as a means of tapping into the prevailing style of living in the UK, with respondentsǯ deprivation scores being used to calibrate an income poverty line. 
Townsendǯs influential definition of poverty was: 
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 Ǯ)ndividuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when 
they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and 
have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely 
encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so 
seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, 
in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activitiesǯ ȋTownsend, 
1979: 31). 
 Townsend juxtaposed his own Ǯrelative deprivationǯ approach to poverty with previous 
absolutist, subsistence approaches – and, in particular, with the work of Seebohm 
Rowntree (1901; 1941; Rowntree and Lavers, 1951). 
 
Rowntree attempted to set a poverty line at the level of resources required to achieve Ǯmerely physical efficiencyǯ. Thus, the focus of his first study was on Ǯbare subsistence 
rather than living…[t]he dietary ) selected was more economical and less attractive than was given to paupers in workhousesǯ ȋRowntree, ͳͻͶͳ: ͳͲʹȌ. This Ǯabsoluteǯ conception 
of poverty related to wholly asocial living: Ǯnot a farthing was allowed in the course of the whole year for anything beyond mere physical needsǯ (1941: 451).  However, while 
Rowntree uprated his poverty standard between his first and final surveys, he had, 
Townsend claimed, failed to provide a convincing account for why this this uprating had 
occurred and how it could be consistent with a subsistence conception of poverty (see 
Townsend, 1970: 13; 1962: 215-218). 
 
Townsend argued that peopleǯs needs were both physical and social; that there could be 
no successful attempt to divide physical and social needs, since seemingly Ǯbasicǯ needs, 
for example for nutrition, were met in ways which served social functions. He provided 
the example of a cup of tea which, while nutritionally worthless, performed an important social role; offering tea to visitors made Ǯa small contribution … towards 
maintaining the threads of social relationshipsǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͻ: ͷͲȌ. The concept of poverty 
should therefore, Townsend argued, focus on the full range of needs, both physical and 
social, insisting that the style of living to which the concept of poverty would relate 
should be participation (1979: 88) and not merely subsistence (1979: 33).  
 
This was the relativist conception, and on the point of relativity, Townsend made two 
distinct, but inter-related arguments: first, that absolute needs, determined without 
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reference to prevailing norms, did not exist and thus could not serve as the basis for an 
absolute conception of poverty (1962: 218-9; 1970: 2); and second, that the norms to 
which a poverty standard should relate ought to be determined with reference to the Ǯsocieties in which they belongǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͻ: ͵ͳ, see also ͳͻ͹Ͳ: ʹ; ͳͻͷͶ: ͳ͵ͶȌ. The distinction 
between these two positions is, as we shall see, of some importance. 
 Townsendǯs conceptualisation of poverty was centred around the key concepts of Ǯstyle of livingǯ, on the one hand, and Ǯresourcesǯ, on the other ȋͳͻ͹ͻ: ͵͵Ȍ. A personǯs style of living was understood as Ǯthe set of customs and activities which they are expected to share or in which they are expected to joinǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͻ: ͷͶȌ, and thus explicitly included 
aspects of social living. Furthermore, the customs which individuals and families were 
expected to participate in would evolve over time as society became richer. For 
example, changes in social patterns whereby families would live in two or three 
bedroom, instead of one bedroom, houses, or the emergence in the twentieth century of a tradition of taking an annual holiday away from oneǯs home, raised the level of 
expectations which individuals and families were required to meet (1979: 52), which 
imposed new resource demands on households. And for Townsend, the concept of 
poverty should relate to circumstances where individualsǯ and familiesǯ total resources 
were insufficient to allow such participation in established customs and consumption 
patterns in society (1979: 88; 1962: 225).  
 
Rather than assigning a cost to each item on his deprivation index (i.e. the method of 
Rowntree), Townsend explored the relationship between resources and deprivation. Townsendǯs hypothesis was that a threshold could be identified: Ǯas resources for any 
individual or family are diminished, there is a point at which there occurs a sudden 
withdrawal from participation in the customs and activities sanctioned by the cultureǯ 
(Townsend, 1979: 57). He claimed that the evidence for such a threshold was suggestive 
rather than clear-cut, but could be identified at approximately 150 per cent of the 
Supplementary Benefit scale (1979: 261). 
 
One consequence of seeking to set a poverty line at a meaningful level, reflecting 
participation in the customary style of living of society, is that the poverty standard may 
vary as a percentage of relative income over time. So, while Townsend noted that the 
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Ǯthresholdǯ he identified was set at ͳͷͲ per cent of the Supplementary Benefit scale, 
there is nothing in his theory to suggest that this percentage would not rise, or fall, if he 
had repeated the survey ten years later. This is, of course, rather demanding on the 
social scientist, and particularly on analysts reliant on secondary data, who might not 
have the wealth of deprivation information available in dedicated poverty surveys such as Townsendǯs. To that extent, it is perhaps not surprising that many analysts adopt 
arbitrary income thresholds, such as 60 per cent of median income, as a non-ideal 
solution to the problem of a variable ideal threshold. Indeed, this approach can be 
justified by reference to Townsendǯs own writings: ǮCertainly  no standard of sufficiency could be revised [over time] only to take account of 
changes in prices, for that would be to ignore changes in the goods and services consumed 
as well as new obligations and expectations placed on members of the community. 
Lacking an alternative criterion, the best assumption would be to relate sufficiency to the 
average rise in real incomesǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͻ: ͷʹ-3, emphasis added). 
 
At least in terms of the trend over time, then, the 60 per cent median income threshold 
provides a rough proxy of the Townsendian concept of poverty.  
 
The central aspects of the Townsendian conception of poverty are, therefore, the 
following: (i) the concept of poverty is itself based on the concepts of resources and 
styles of living; (ii) the style of living on which the concept of poverty is based should 
encompass all needs, including social needs, and should adopt a participation and not a 
subsistence standard; (iii) the relationship between resources and style of living will 
need to be examined empirically in order to identify a threshold, but (iv) in absence of 
detailed information about styles of living, we may expect the poverty line, expressed as 
a threshold of resources, to rise in line with average or median income over time. 
Relativity in terms of style of living was thus taken to imply relativity in terms of 
resources. 
 
Problems with the Townsendian framework 
 
One important problem with the Townsendian framework is that it treats the rising tide of Ǯstyle of livingǯ as being of precisely zero importance in itself, representing merely the Ǯcompliance costsǯ of participation, as Niemietz has recently argued ȋʹͲͳͳ: ͳͶͺȌ. One 
important contribution of Townsendǯs framework was in demonstrating the social 
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nature of needs, and in arguing that the concept of poverty cannot be divorced from 
changes in these need over time and place. However, in emphasising the rising tide of 
styles of living as being of no intrinsic importance, contributing only to the resource 
demands on households, the consequence is that an absolute increase in wealth, where 
this occurs without any change in the distribution of resources, will make no difference 
whatsoever in terms of the level of poverty in the Townsendian schema, and poverty 
rates are, on the contrary, driven almost entirely by the distribution of resources within 
a society, irrespective of the prevailing level of wealth.  
 
On this point, the Townsendian schema seems to get things wrong, twice. First, since 
poverty is, in effect, determined by the distribution of resources alone, there may be 
more poverty in rich countries or cities than poorer ones – more, for example, in Britain 
than in Burkina Faso; more in Manchester than in Manila. This helps to explain why 
analysis operating within a Townsendian schema can produce some rather counter-
intuitive examples, such as the comparison from Bulgaria and Britain discussed above. 
 
Secondly, however, even when the Townsendian framework offers an answer which 
intuition suggests to be correct (i.e. that there is more poverty in Burkina Faso than 
Britain; more in Manila than Manchester), it appears to offer the wrong reason for this 
result. If poverty in Burkina Faso is greater than in Britain, then under the Townsendian 
conception this is not because the standard or style of living is lower (since this would 
be, in effect, discounted) but because resources are more unequally distributed.  
  
Direct approaches to conceptualising and measuring poverty 
 
While Townsend himself presented a resource-centric conceptualisation of poverty, 
others who extended and developed his ideas attempted to conceptualise and measure 
poverty directly, using indicators of material deprivation (see especially Mack and 
Lansley, 1985), as we have indicated below. Townsendǯs classic study had contained 
two sets of deprivation indicators: a full list of sixty indicators measuring Ǯstyles of livingǯ across numerous dimensions, and a summary index of twelve items drawn from 
this longer list, with the latter used to calibrate his poverty line. As we have argued 
elsewhere (Hick, 2012Ȍ, Townsendǯs summary deprivation index was in no way 
11 
 
representative of the breadth of the full list, omitting many non-material dimensions of 
deprivation such as conditions at work, health, education, environmental deprivation, 
fuel and light and clothing. The result was a unidimensional measure of material 
deprivation, focusing on marketable commodities and activities, which has become 
extremely influential in the literature (see Mack and Lansley, 1985; Nolan and Whelan, 
1996, inter alia).  
 
At times, and in order to reflect the widespread belief that poverty is about Ǯmore than moneyǯ, this direct approach to measuring poverty is accompanied by a wider concern 
with social exclusion and/or multiple deprivation. However, these concepts remain 
underspecified within the literature on poverty and, most importantly, are typically 
treated as being a non-essential part of analysis - too often overlooked in favour of the 
narrower, unidimensional concept of material deprivation (Hick, 2012). This narrower, 
unidimensional focus is problematic because it fails to capture the many ways in which peopleǯs lives can be impoverished. 
 
We have argued in this section that there are a number of problems with the 
conceptualisation of poverty in the Townsendian schema. The question is, then, 
whether there is a framework which can overcome some of these problems. 
 
III Poverty as Capability Deprivation 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline an alternative, capability-based framework built 
around the two concepts of material poverty and multiple deprivation. In Poverty as 
Capability Deprivation, the framework (i) provides for a multidimensional assessment, 
(ii) focussing on both monetary and non-monetary dimensions and constraints, and (iii) 
the relationship between living standards and resources is subject to empirical scrutiny, 
and is not prescribed by theory.  
 
Poverty as Capability Deprivation prioritises a focus on ends over means, and since the 
ways in which human lives can be impoverished are inherently plural, analysis will need to take on a multidimensional form, focussing on the deprivation of peopleǯs core 
capabilities (the specification of which we discuss below). Indeed, from a capability 
perspective, the understanding of impoverishment itself is distinctive, for the approach 
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suggests that it is the impoverishment of our capabilities which should be of concern, 
and these may extend beyond dimensions which are immediately related to material 
resources.  
 
For Lister (2004), this shows that the capability approach is doing something quite 
different to a poverty approach since not all capability deprivation arises because of a 
lack of resources and, thus, would typically not be considered to be a case of poverty. 
One reason why the capability and poverty literatures have often arrived at a somewhat 
different answer to the question of how to understand poverty is because the question 
they ask is distinct: a poverty perspective typically asks Ǯwhat is poverty?ǯ, while the question the capability approach asks is closer to Ǯwhat matters?ǯ. The first question is 
conceptual, while the latter is ethical, and the distinction between these questions can, 
we suggest, shed light on the relationship between the capability and sociological 
approaches to understanding poverty. 
 
This reflects, we suggest, a permanent tension between the conceptual and ethical 
aspects of poverty analysis. This tension arises because while a lack of resources is 
typically considered to be at the core of the concept of poverty, the ethical importance of 
any particular dimension is not derived from its responsiveness to resources, but by an 
appeal to the living standard directly. This may take a number of forms. For Townsend, 
there was an ethical appeal to human needs (e.g. 1970; 18); for Nolan and Whelan ȋʹͲͳͳ: ͵͵Ȍ, more recently, to Ǯproblems that people would avoid if they couldǯ. But 
human needs and problems which all would wish to avoid inevitably extend to both 
monetary and non-monetary dimensions, which imposes a requirement to adopt a 
framework which can consider both. 
 
Furthermore, if a particular dimension, such as the ability to participate in the life of 
society, matters, then a lack of resources cannot be the only constraint of interest, for 
there an ethical distinction between choice and constraint (Le Grand, 1991; Piachaud, 
1981; Sen, 2009: 237) in a way that there is not between one constraint and another 
(see also Hick, 2012). There is, by now, reasonable agreement that non-participation in 
the life of society because of choice should not be considered to be evidence of poverty 
or deprivation (see, inter alia, Nolan and Whelan, 2011: 32; Piachaud, 1981). But the 
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Ǯremainderǯ after subtracting choice is not a lack of resources. There may be other 
constraints which impede participation such as disability or discrimination and while 
these are conceptually distinct from a lack of resources, they cannot be seen as being of 
no importance. 
 
This tension is problematic because, while the delineation of the concept of poverty is 
often based on conceptual considerations (e.g. focussing only on resource-based 
dimensions and constraints), there is a desire to use the concept to make ethical 
statements. But the centrality of resources – which influences both the dimensions of 
interest and the constraints considered – is justified in conceptual and not ethical terms, 
and, from an ethical perspective, too much is ignored by the focus on material poverty 
which results. 
 
Our focus, according to the capability approach, should be on what people can do or be; 
on impoverished lives, and not depleted wallets (Sen, 2000). This approach to 
assessment reflects the primarily ethical orientation of the capability approach, which is 
more concerned with establishing Ǯwhat matters?ǯ than with deciding whether and how 
this ethical terrain is to be divided up into constituent concepts. This latter point is 
important, for it implies that a narrower concept of poverty, centred around a lack of 
resources, can be retained if the broader additional terrain is taken up by another 
concept – for example, that of deprivation. )n this case the Ǯwhat we studyǯ is therefore 
delineated by ethical concerns (what matters?) while the division of this terrain into 
concepts such as poverty and deprivation can be based on conceptual distinctions (i.e. 
poverty is about a lack of resources, deprivation considers a wider range of constraints). 
On this view, two concepts are required in order to respond to the conceptual and 
ethical concerns which typically motivate poverty analysis, and a full assessment, 
capable of supporting ethical claims, would require a focus on both poverty and 
deprivation. In this sense, the division of this terrain between the two concepts of 
poverty and deprivation implies that an approach adopting a Ǯnarrowǯ focus on material 
poverty requires consideration of the broader concept of multiple deprivation (see Hick, 
2012, for a discussion). 
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The third area in which Poverty as Capability Deprivation is distinctive to the 
Townsendian framework is on the question of the relationship between resources and 
capabilities (or resources and styles of living in Townsendian terminology).  In Poverty 
as Capability Deprivation, the relationship between resources and capabilities is one for 
empirical analysis, and not one to be specified by theory. Furthermore, since the 
relevant capabilities are multidimensional, the relationship between resources and 
capabilities is likely to vary from dimension to dimension. This implies that the uses of 
income are likely to be quite different – for example, it may be that reductions in severe 
malnutrition and stunting are largely determined by rising levels of absolute wealth, 
while participating the life of society, for example, might be entirely relative in the space 
of resources.  
 
Material poverty and multiple deprivation 
The framework proposed here thus employs the two concepts of material poverty and 
multiple deprivation. It is necessary at this point to say something about the division 
between poverty and deprivation, because while the claim that poverty is about material 
dimensions while deprivation considers non-monetary dimensions and constraints 
appears to have a certain intuitive appeal, it is, we suggest, something of an 
oversimplification. Existing research has shown that the relationship between resources 
and dimensions we expect to be related to resources (e.g. material deprivation) is often 
much weaker than typically assumed; conversely, other dimensions we define as 
multiple deprivation (e.g. subjective well-being, ill-health) are related to resources, 
albeit in a weaker fashion (Hick, forthcoming a). So attempting to distinguish between 
the resource-based and non-resource-based dimensions is likely to be far from 
straightforward in practice. With this caveat in mind, then, do we mean by poverty and 
multiple deprivation?  
 
Poverty can be defined as inadequate material living standards arising from a lack of 
resources. These living standards are understood as particular capabilities – the ability 
to afford participating in the life of society, the ability to avoid going into debt for 
ordinary living expenses, the ability to afford a basket of essential goods, the ability to 
afford to be adequately nourished, and so forth. This definition of poverty follows the 
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Ǯnarrowǯ approach to conceptualising poverty, with a lack of resources at its core. 
However, while it bears a deliberate resemblance to Nolan and Whelanǯs redefinition of the Townsendian concept, it shifts the emphasis from Ǯexclusion from the life of the societyǯ to Ǯinadequate material living standardsǯ, recognising the former might be only 
one of the capabilities which comprise the latter. This is because, even amongst the 
Ǯmaterialǯ dimensions, there is no reason to assume that there is one dimension which, to 
the exclusion of all others, deserves priority in our understanding of material poverty. 
In this way, the capability approach would be consistent with multidimensionality even 
within the concept of material poverty. 
 
The measurement of material poverty: fixed and moving parts 
 
Moving beyond the issue of dimensionality and the broader assessment demanded by 
the capability approach, we may ask whether, in operational terms, the measurement of 
material poverty would, under Poverty as Capability Deprivation, proceed in the same 
fashion as the existing, Townsendian tradition. Here, we focus explicitly on one 
dimension – the ability to take part in the life of society, which Sen has suggested is 
likely to be one of the important dimensions for analysis (Sen, 1995: 15).  
 
In understanding the relationship between measurement indicators and an underlying 
concept, we introduce a distinction between the fixed parts and moving parts of poverty 
measurement. On this view, the fixed part is the relevant capability – e.g. the ability to 
participate in the life of society, and the moving parts are the indicator(s) which are 
required in order for measurement to be aligned with this conceptualisation. As the 
relationship between these moving parts and the fixed part (i.e. the meaning of the 
underlying capability) changes, it may be necessary to re-specify the moving parts – for 
example, by amending the income poverty threshold or selecting alternative 
deprivation items.  
 
In practice, while it is straight-forward to automatically up-rate an income poverty 
threshold with median income over time, amending the moving parts proves more 
difficult for deprivation indicator approaches. Authors working within the Townsendian 
tradition have, in dedicated surveys of poverty in the UK, sought to update and augment 
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the list of deprivation items over time in order to reflect changes in socially perceived 
necessities over time (e.g. Mack and Lansley, 1985; Gordon and Pantazis, 1997; Gordon 
et al., 2000; 2013). However, this is typically not possible where analysts are reliant on 
secondary data since most social surveys collect information about a fixed set of 
deprivation items over time or in different countries.  
 
This is problematic because while in theory the fixed part should be the meaning of the 
underlying concept, and the indicators should be the moving part, in practice it is often 
the indicators which are fixed, though they are the moving part, while the meaning will 
thus be variable, whereas it should be fixed. There is a parallel here with the concern 
expressed in the comparative social policy literature about the need to ensure 
measurement equivalence when conducting comparative analyses. Drawing on Marshǯs 
distinction between formal and functional equivalence, Kennett (2006: 293) notes that Ǯusing identical formal procedures when comparing different societies may produce 
functionally non-equivalent meaningsǯ. If deprivation indicators are to be used to 
capture an underlying concept of poverty with a certain meaning, then we must be 
sensitive to circumstances in which different indicators (as moving parts) may be 
required in order to ensure that the meaning of the indicators (the fixed part) is the 
same across time and place.  
 
A second critique of the use of deprivation indicators in order to measure poverty 
comes from Berthoud and Bryan (2011: 137), who argue that while deprivation 
indicators may be of use in calibrating an income poverty threshold (i.e. the method of TownsendȌ, Ǯno index can support the strong set of assumptions required to treat it as a direct measure of povertyǯ. )n essence, Berthoud and Bryanǯs argument is that a short, 
summary index is not sufficient to act as a measure of poverty. At the very least, this 
critique poses a significant challenge to those who work with such indicators to ensure 
that the moving parts (the indicators) are both necessary and sufficient to capture the 
meaning of the underlying concept which they are intended to represent. 
 
Distinguishing between the fixed and moving parts of poverty measurement, then, 
requires two tasks: first, deciding on the fixed part and, second, aligning the fixed and 
moving parts. The first task is thus to specify the meaning of the capability itself. Having 
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established this, and taking exclusion from the life of society as being a relevant 
example here, the challenge is to identify an approach to measurement in terms of the 
moving parts (i.e. the indicators) which, at any point in time, is both necessary and 
sufficient to capture this underlying concept, and which will be amended over time and 
space as the relationship between the indicators and the relevant capability varies. 
 
Conceptualising multiple deprivation 
 
The concept of multiple deprivation is defined here as the enforced experience of low 
living standards. This multidimensional approach to conceptualising deprivation as 
being more than just material deprivation recognises that Ǯthe lives of human beings can be blighted and impoverished in quite different waysǯ ȋAnand and Sen, ͳͻͻ͹: ͷȌ. This 
presents an ethical requirement to consider both monetary and non-monetary 
dimensions and constraints, even if we wish to accommodate these within two concepts 
of poverty and deprivation. How, then, should we decide on the dimensionality of 
multiple deprivation? To answer this question, we turn to John Rawlsǯ (1971; 1988) 
argument in favour of a resource-centric perspective of advantage and disadvantage. 
 
Primary goods and primary goals 
 
In articulating the claims of the capability approach vis-à-vis income-centric analysis, 
Sen often refers explicitly to the work of John Rawlsǯ (1971) Justice as Fairness. Rawls 
maintained that direct measures of living standards such as functionings and 
capabilities could not serve as the basis for understanding advantage and disadvantage 
because of the variability in the conceptions of the good which people hold (1988: 255-
6). The state is unable to prioritise one or other of these conceptions because such plurality of ends implies that any attempt to do so will not be Ǯaffirmed by citizens generallyǯ and thus their pursuit Ǯgives the state a sectarian characterǯ ȋp. ʹͷ͸Ȍ. Rawlsǯ 
response to this problem was to limit his own focus to what he called primary goods, defined as Ǯrights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealthǯ (1971: ͻʹȌ. Such primary goods are Ǯthings which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wantsǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͳ: ͻʹȌ, because Ǯwhatever oneǯs system of ends, primary goods are necessary meansǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͳ: ͻ͵Ȍ. Assessing disadvantage in the space of primary goods 
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allows the analyst to be neutral towards the competing conceptions of the good that 
people hold. In terms of the analysis of poverty, this would be consistent with a 
resource-centric measurement approach.  
 
However, there is another way to respond to the Ǯfact of pluralismǯ other than to retreat 
to primary goods (or from Ǯendsǯ to Ǯmeansǯ). To focus on ends themselves will only violate neutrality between the ends which people hold ȋthe Ǯfact of pluralismǯ, Rawls, 
1988: 259) if there do not exist Ǯprimary goalsǯ – ends which each person shares, 
whatever their conception of the good and whatever else they value. 
 
We suggest that – at least at a sufficient level of generality – it is possible to find certain 
shared goals that people value, whatever else they value (see also Drydyk, 2011; Brandolini and dǯAlessio, ͳͻͻͺ: ͹, inter alia). On the question of the dimensionality of 
the quality of life, for example, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission (2009: 58) note that Ǯ[w]hile the precise list of these features inevitably rests on value judgements, there is a consensus that quality of life depends on peopleǯs health and education, their everyday 
activities (which include the right to a decent job and housing, their participation in the 
political process, the social and natural environment in which they live, and the factors shaping their personal and economic securityǯ. 
 
If such primary goals exist, then the fact of pluralism does not necessitate a retreat from 
the ends to the means of living and it is these primary goals, we suggest, which provide 
the appropriate basis for a conception of multiple deprivation. This enables us to focus 
on capabilities for which each person is assumed to prefer more rather than less – at 
least over a certain range of achievement (Atkinson et al., 2002: 21).  
 
It is worth considering the various aspects of this definition. By capabilities, we intend 
ends which a person is unable to achieve, rather than simply those they do not achieve. 
In practical terms, the study of poverty and deprivation typically starts with a focus on 
an actual lack of achievement in a particular domain. What is required in order to give information about lack of achievement a Ǯclear and accepted normative interpretationǯ 
(Atkinson et al., 2002: 21) is either that (i) there are explicit questions about whether 
the outcome arose because of choice or constraint (see also Nolan and Whelan, 2011: 
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20-30) or (ii) the threshold is set at a sufficiently low level so that the level would be 
widely interpreted as representing constraint and not choice (i.e. it is implausible to 
suggest that the lack of achievement arose by choice). 
 
There are a number of ways by which universality might be ascertained, one being common Ǯnecessitiesǯ surveys, which ask respondents whether a set of items are 
considered to be necessities or not. Most necessities surveys – at least within the 
poverty literature – focus on the components or indicators of particular dimensions, but 
there is, of course, no particular reason why such an approach could not be used for 
identifying the extent of agreement about the importance of particular dimensions or 
capabilities themselves. 
 
Indeed, existing research demonstrates that, when given the opportunity, the public 
endorse a conception of necessity which is not limited to resource-based items or 
dimensions. For example, an Australian survey found that being Ǯtreated with respect by other peopleǯ and having Ǯstreets that are safe to walk in at nightǯ were considered to be 
necessities by 98.5 and 97.7 of the population, respectively (Saunders and Abe, 2010: 
84). Similarly, the most recent Poverty and Social Exclusion survey in the UK found that Ǯpersonal time for adults away from family responsibilitiesǯ ȋFahmy et al., 2011, 8) was 
one of the necessities of life in twenty-first century Britain. The resource-centric view of 
what is deemed to be a necessity is thus not held by the public themselves, but is 
imposed by analysts seeking to limit the analysis of poverty to unmet Ǯmaterialǯ needs.  
 
Claims about the universality of particular dimensions or capabilities do not themselves 
imply that each person prefers to achieve these goals using the same means. For 
example, it seems obvious to suggest that there is more variation at the level of type of 
diet (i.e. whether one prefers apples or oranges, eats red meat or is a vegetarian) than 
the goals to which such satisfiers are directed; for example, being adequately nourished. 
Doyal and Gough (1991: 155) note in this vein that Ǯwhile the basic individual needs for 
physical health and autonomy are universal, many goods and services required to satisfy these needs are culturally variableǯ.   
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If a person or group does not value a particular capability – the fixed part – then the 
framework is to that extent non-ideal because it assumes individuals or groups value 
what they, in fact, do not. If a person does not value one of the indicators used to tap into 
the particular dimension then it may be the wrong Ǯmoving partǯ has been selected for 
that group, and that another can be found. For example, research has suggested that 
typical deprivation items are, for many older people, Ǯsimply not consistent with lifestyle changes that occurred in old ageǯ ȋLegard et al., 2008: 18; see also McKay, 2004; 
Hick, 2013, on the challenges of using deprivation indicators to measure material 
poverty across the lifecourse). It may be expected that identifying the valued 
capabilities is more straight-forward than identifying valued Ǯmovingǯ parts, or 
indicators, used to tap into these capabilities. 
 
Taken together, what these conditions ultimately require is for the dimensions selected 
to be able to receive widespread acceptance – for the lack of achievement in particular 
dimensions to be understood in an unambiguous, normative fashion (Atkinson et al., ʹͲͲʹȌ, as outcomes which Ǯwe could reasonably expect most people to wish to avoid if possibleǯ ȋNolan and Whelan, ʹͲͳͳ: ͵ʹȌ. These primary goals, or Ǯcore capabilitiesǯ, 
which all people value can, it is argued, meet this requirement. 
 
Towards identifying dimensionality 
 
If the focus of the concepts of poverty and deprivation is just this shared core of 
capabilities, these concepts must, as far as possible encompass all of this core. It is 
widely recognised that any multidimensional approach should be as comprehensive as 
possible in terms of the dimensions considered (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2002: 24; Townsend, ͳͻͺ͹: ͳͶͲȌ; in practice, that assessment considers Ǯthe darker side of the entire lifestyle of a peopleǯ ȋTownsend, ͳͻͺ͹: ͳʹͻȌ. 
 
Based on the aforementioned discussion and principles, what are the dimensions which 
analysis should focus in the rich-nation context considered here? This list in inevitably 
partial since further analysis might be undertaken in making such selection – for 
example, survey data may be used to further validate the dimensions selected here, or 
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empirical analysis may be employed in determining dimensionality to avoid double-
counting and so forth.  
 
Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that assessment would include a focus on 
the following capabilities: the ability to participate in the life of society, to live in 
adequate housing, to avoid premature mortality and live a normal life span, to be well 
nourished, to avoid involuntary migration, to avoid ill-health and poor mental health, to 
avoid alcoholism and drug dependence, to avail of educational opportunities (at least at 
certain levels), to avoid discrimination and humiliation, to have autonomy, satisfaction 
with life, to avoid crime and the fear of crime, to not experience unemployment. In each 
case, we assume that – at least up to a certain point, everybody prefers more rather than 
less of these things and thus that they can be interpreted in normative terms. 
 
However, this list is intended to be illustrative: debate about the relevant dimensions is 
central to the literature on poverty analysis and more important for our purposes here 
is to specify the importance of focusing on a comprehensive range of dimensions which 
match the definition of core capabilities we have outlined above. 
 
On perfection and the burden of measurement 
 
One final point on the question of consensus and universality relates to perfection. How 
far is the framework presented here weakened by departures from consensus and 
universality? Rather than considering attempts to reach consensus as either successful 
or not (i.e. as a binary), it is worth considering all frameworks as specifying an ideal, to 
which actual empirical implementation approximates with some degree of distance. 
Thus, while the ideal aim is universality, it is to be expected that approaching 
universality will, in practice, be the relevant goal, as a non-ideal departure from 
universality itself for it is important, as Bradshaw et al. (2007) counsel, that perfection 
does not become the enemy of the good. In practice, the requirement of assessment is 
not, we suggest, perfection, but the ability to produce reliable and valid answers to a 
finite set of questions ȋsuch as Ǯhow many people are in poverty?ǯ, Ǯwho is most at risk of poverty?ǯ, Ǯis poverty rising or falling?ǯ, and so forthȌ. The significance of departures 
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from the ideal depends on their impact on the answers to such questions rather than 
intrinsically limiting the approach itself. 
 
It may be legitimately asked whether the framework presented here imposes a severe 
burden or measurement and, of course, this is one of the central charges made against 
the capability approach (e.g. Sugden, 1993). It is certainly the case that as a framework 
becomes more complex, in particular by moving beyond a unidimensional approach, this 
entails a trade-off in terms of ease of measurement (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 21; see 
also Robeyns, 2005: 32). A number of points may be made on the extent of the 
measurement burden imposed by the proposed framework. First, any multidimensional 
approach to measuring poverty involves a measurement burden – these are not, in the 
main, special problems for the capability approach.1 Second, one particular burden 
imposed by any multidimensional poverty framework is that it may require the 
inclusion of dimensions not currently captured by social surveys. However, identifying 
the dimensions we cannot currently satisfactorily measure can itself act as the first step 
in rectifying the situation (Robeyns, 2003: 71). This is usefully illustrated by the work of 
Alkire and colleagues in identifying, and subsequently capturing, Ǯmissing dimensionsǯ 
in multidimensional poverty analysis (Alkire, 2007).  
 
Finally, Nolan and Whelan (2007: 147) claim that even if poverty is understood to be a 
multidimensional concept, this does not in itself mean that one cannot adopt a 
unidimensional measurement approach. Given the well-known weak association 
between different dimensions of poverty (e.g. Bradshaw and Finch, 2003; Hick, 
forthcoming b), we should perhaps not be too optimistic that a unidimensional 
measurement approach can ultimately capture the multidimensionality of poverty. 
Nonetheless, it may be possible to identify non-ideal proxies for forms of deprivation 
which are difficult to measure or which are not captured in many surveys. However, 
these would need to be identified empirically rather than chosen on the basis of 
assumed relationships and face validity, and any retreat to such proxies would, of 
course, need to be treated as a non-ideal deviation from the framework presented here. 
 
IV Implications 
                                                          
1 I am indebted to Howard Glennerster for this point. 
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In this penultimate section, we explore some implications of the framework outlined 
here in terms of conceptualising and measuring poverty over space and time, noting 
how Poverty as Capability Deprivation is likely to provide a somewhat different 
approach to analysis than Poverty as Relative Deprivation. 
 
A number of recent studies have pointed to some counter-intuitive examples when 
drawing pan-European comparisons using relative income approaches. Relying on a 
relative income measure of, say, 60 per cent of median income, may suggest that, for 
example, Ireland has a higher rate of poverty than Estonia (Whelan and Maître, 2009), 
or that the rate of poverty in Italy is twice that of the Czech Republic (Nolan and 
Whelan, 2011: 57), or that child poverty in the UK is greater than in Hungary (UNICEF, 
2012: 12). As we have noted, one important feature of most existing critiques is that 
they typically view these counter-intuitive results as problems of measurement – as an Ǯartefact of the measure of poverty employedǯ ȋWhelan and Maîtreǯs, ʹͲͲͻa: 76) – 
arising from the relative income poverty measure.  
 
Poverty as Capability Deprivation takes a different approach. If the conclusion that 
Ireland has more poverty than Estonia, or that Britain is more poor than Bulgaria, appears perverse, it is surely because Ǯexclusion from the life of the societyǯ is but one of 
the dimensions that we are be interested in. It is not that participation is trivial, just that 
it is not all that is important (see also Ravallion and Chen, 2009). Other intrinsically 
important dimensions – such as avoiding housing deprivation and homelessness, being 
in reasonable health and achieving a full life span, etc., matter too, and deserve greater 
recognition in our analysis. Thus, and in line with one of the central themes of the 
capability approach, the informational base of much analysis conducted within the 
Townsendian tradition is simply too narrow. So the multidimensional focus provided by 
the capability approach is one reason why it may be a preferable approach when 
analysing poverty in different nations and, indeed, in one nation over time.  
 
However, the approach may also recommend a distinctive approach, within any 
particular dimension, to the measurement of poverty. Unlike in Poverty as Relative 
Deprivation, there is no insistence that what is understood as an adequate level of 
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capability be determined solely by societal or national norms. Indeed, the reference 
point for the adequate level of capability is likely to vary from dimension to dimension, 
and should be determined by the meaning intended by the dimensions themselves. 
 
This is not to suggest that poverty is an Ǯabsoluteǯ concept – absolute in the sense of 
being drawn without reference to prevailing customs and norms. It is, rather, to note that Townsendǯs critique of absolute approaches contained two claims: first, that an 
absolute concept of poverty, which did not rely on social customs and norms, was 
impossible, and, secondly, that the norms which should form the basis of the concept of poverty were those of oneǯs society or nation-state. The two claims are, of course, 
distinct and acceptance of the former does not imply the validity of the latter. 
 
In response to the perceived limitations of state-bound income-centric measures of 
poverty, Fahey (2007) has recommended that these be supplemented by an EU-wide 
income poverty measure, such as 60% of median EU income. Such an approach 
produces patterns of poverty which are more intuitive, displays a closer association 
with a range of forms of multiple deprivation than standard approaches, and can, Fahey 
suggests, represent a Ǯconvergence indicatorǯ, reflecting the EUǯs competence in 
promoting convergence between EU regions. Nonetheless, this approach also has its 
shortcomings: unless calculated over a fixed set of Member States, in the event of 
further EU enlargement it may register a rise in poverty simply because median EU 
income would fall (Atkinson et al., 2005: 114). More fundamentally, perhaps, it is not 
immediately clear what capability this might be said to represent in terms of what 
people, in a tangible sense, are able to do and be, unlike, say, an anchored poverty line, 
uprated in line with prices, which has a fairly straightforward interpretation in terms of 
the ability to afford a basket of goods over time. 
 
An alternative response to the perceived deficiencies of relative income measures of 
poverty has been to rely to a greater extent on material deprivation measures. In terms 
of the pan-European analysis, one solution has been to employ a fixed deprivation index 
in order to measure poverty across Europe – either on its own (e.g. Guio et al., 2012), 
supplementing a relative income measure (e.g. UNICEF, 2012), or as part of a combined 
low income-material deprivation measure (Nolan and Whelan, 2011). Again, this may 
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have the desirable characteristic of producing more plausible results (considerably 
more poverty found in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe), but it makes 
conceptual concessions that are not always acknowledged: as Berthoudǯs ȋʹͲͳʹ: ʹʹȌ 
recent empirical analysis of poverty in twenty-six European countries finds, since the 
deprivation indicators are fixed, Ǯobjective deprivation can be interpreted as an indicator of absolute povertyǯ – i.e. the approach that Townsendǯs work had sought to 
banish. 
 
In terms of both of these strategies, and as argued above, adopting a capability 
perspective would require us to be clear about what capability – what being or doing – 
these measures are intended to capture, and to ensure that this falls within the concept 
of core capabilities outlined above. Clarifying the nature of the capability which one is 
seeking to capture is likely to determine, in turn, the decision about whether a state-
bounded conception or European reference group is to be preferred (on the question of 
reference points and poverty analysis, see also Kangas and Ritakallio, 2004). It is 
difficult to circumscribe, as a matter of theory, one particular reference point for each of 
the important dimensions. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that for dimensions 
which themselves relate explicitly to oneǯs society or to participation – for example, the 
ability to participate in the life of society; the ability to appear in public without shame, 
etc., national reference groups are preferable:  this is required in order to maintain the 
within-society or within-nation meaning of these capabilities. 
  
For other dimensions where there is no explicit within-nation focus – for example, being 
able to achieve a full life span, being healthy, being adequately housed, and so forth, the 
thresholds might be selected with reference to the best achieving countries within an 
analytic comparison group. Here, a regional comparison, such as Europeanisation of 
reference groups, might be more appropriate, since there is little to suggest that understandings of a Ǯnormalǯ life span or Ǯadequateǯ housing and so forth refer solely, or 
indeed primarily, to the societal or national norms. Thus, the inevitability of oneǯs own 
nation-state or society being the reference point would seem only to hold for 
dimensions which themselves explicitly relate to within-society comparison. However, 
the crucial point is that the choice of reference points is made based on the meaning 
intended by the capability itself. 
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Having clarified what capability a dimension was intended to capture, the aim of 
measurement, as we have discussed above, would be to ensure that the indicator(s) 
reflected this capability at each time and place (in the parlance adopted here, that it would be ǮfixedǯȌ. The existing literature on poverty often emphasises that deprivation 
indicators represent necessities, and evidence to this effect is often marshalled in order 
to overcome the charge of arbitrariness. However, as MacCarthaigh (2014) has recently 
argued, all uses of the language of necessity point – explicitly or implicitly – to some end 
state. The relevant question is: necessary for what? 
 
Thus, adopting a capability perspective is distinctive in (at least) two ways: first, while 
there is a trend towards multidimensional analysis, the capability approach views such 
analysis not as desirable, but as positively necessary. And secondly, within any 
particular dimension, it requires us to be explicit about what capability – what being 
and doing – we are attempting to capture, and to give consideration to how the 
measurement approach may need to amended over time or space in order to preserve 
its alignment with the intended meaning.  
 
V Conclusion 
In this paper, we have provided a critique of the dominant framework for 
understanding poverty, Poverty as Relative Deprivation, and have outlined an 
alternative, Poverty as Capability Deprivation, which can overcome some of the 
limitations of the Townsendian framework. Poverty analysis is undergoing a 
multidimensional turn, due, in part, to a growing awareness of the limitations of relative 
income approaches. However, we have argued in this paper that the counter-intuitive 
findings which flow from cross-national relative income poverty analysis are not, in fact, 
artefacts of the measurement approach but are instead entirely consistent with the 
Townsendian conception of poverty.  
 
The response to such counter-intuitive comparisons should, we suggest, be to adopt a 
multidimensional conception of poverty and deprivation, understood in this paper as being the deprivation of peopleǯs core capabilities. Despite there being a plurality of 
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ends which people hold, there are nonetheless, we have argued, certain ends which each 
person values, and it is these which form the basis for the framework presented here. 
Poverty as Capability Deprivation focuses on ends (peopleǯs capabilities) rather than 
means (their resources) and its dimensionality is circumscribed by the core capabilities 
which all people are assumed to value. In this framework, multidimensionality is not 
merely desirable – it is necessary, and analysis which seeks to be comprehensive will 
therefore need to consider both material poverty and multiple deprivation. 
 
In this framework, poverty is defined as inadequate living standards arising from a lack 
of resources. Deprivation is defined as the enforced experience of low living standards. The division between Ǯmaterialǯ and Ǯnon-materialǯ dimensions in this way allows the 
framework to preserve continuity with existing approaches and the widespread 
intuitive acceptance of a lack of resources as being central to the concept of poverty 
while, at the same time, emphasising the necessity of focusing on a broader terrain, 
taken up by the concept of multiple deprivation. However, we have suggested that, even 
with the concept of (material) poverty, there is no reason to assume there is one 
capability which, to the exclusion of all others, demands our attention, and have 
cautioned that distinguishing between material poverty and multiple deprivation may 
not be straight-forward in practical terms. 
 
In terms of the measurement of particular dimensions, we have introduced a distinction 
between the fixed and moving parts of poverty measurement as a means of thinking 
about the relationship between measurement indicators and the underlying conception 
of any given dimension. This distinction implies two tasks: first, clarifying the capability 
which each dimension is seeking to capture (specifying the fixed part) and, second, 
selecting indicators which are necessary and sufficient to capture these capabilities at 
any particular place and time. 
 
Taken together, then, it may be that Britain has a greater proportion of the population 
who are excluded from the life of society than in Burkina Faso, but it is also a nation 
with substantially higher life expectancy, literacy, and so forth. It is not that 
participation is trivial, just that it is not all that is important. It is multidimensionality 
which is the key to understanding both why poor nations have considerably more 
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poverty than rich nations and why poverty remains a problem even in the richest 
nations. 
 
Ultimately, the challenge for any framework is to provide valid answers to a finite series of questions, such as: Ǯis poverty rising or falling?ǯ, Ǯwhich groups experience the most 
poverty?ǯ, Ǯwhich nations have the most poverty?ǯ, and so forth. In adopting a 
multidimensional perspective which focusing on peopleǯs capabilities, or ends, rather 
than their resources, or means, it is argued that Poverty as Capability Deprivation can 
offer the basis for such an assessment, and that it can provide conceptual underpinning 
to the multidimensional turn currently being experienced in poverty analysis. 
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